DOI - Vydavatelství Mendelovy univerzity v Brně

Identifikátory DOI

DOI: 10.11118/978-80-7701-042-9-0103

ZOO ALLIANCES: A SPECIAL CASE OF COOPERATION IN RESTRICTED OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET STRUCTURES

Endre Akos Papp1, Szilvia Vetter2, Anna Dunay1
1 John von Neumann University, Doctoral School of Management and Business Administration, Budapest, Hungary
2 University of Veterinary Medicine Budapest, Centre for Animal Welfare, Budapest, Hungary

The study concludes that a combination of club-based membership, public good provision, and strategic game-theoretic interactions drives cooperation in the restricted oligopolistic market of the zoo industry. Zoo alliances serve as a prime example of how institutions navigate these dynamics, carefully balancing collaboration and competition to achieve shared goals. Future research should focus on quantifying the economic impact of cooperative strategies within zoo alliances, particularly in the context of species conservation. Additionally, developing policy recommendations to strengthen sustainability and governance in this sector will be crucial for ensuring long-term success.

Klíčová slova: oligopoly, club theory, public goods, game theory, ZOO industry

stránky: 103-104, online: 2025



Reference

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