

RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF SECURITY FORCES, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY, AND LOYALTY: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE V4 COUNTRIES

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Abstract

The article focuses on the restriction of fundamental rights of members of security forces in the Czech Republic and the V4 countries. It analyzes the legal framework of these restrictions, in particular the prohibition of strikes, political activities, restrictions on business, and the right of association, and their compliance with the principle of proportionality. A comparative approach shows that all V4 countries apply a similar model of depoliticized and disciplined forces, with restrictions enshrined in the constitution and in line with European case law. The study emphasizes that the legitimacy of restrictions is conditional on their proportionality and fair compensation for members. Special attention is paid to the relationship between legal limits, motivation, and loyalty, which fundamentally affect the stability of the forces and thus regional development. In conclusion, the article states that the current legal framework is fundamentally sound, but the challenge for the future remains to maintain a balance between protecting security and respecting the rights of individuals.

Keywords: Security Forces, Restrictions of Fundamental Rights, Proportionality, V4 Countries, Political Neutrality, European Case Law

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Introduction

Security forces are the pillar of public order and regional stability, and thus a prerequisite for development. The state ensures their professionalism and impartiality through legal restrictions on the fundamental rights of their members. The key challenge is to set an appropriate scope for these restrictions so as to balance the rights of individuals with the public interest in an effective and neutral security service that strengthens trust and creates conditions for the socio-economic development of regions.

In recent years, the topic has also resonated in practice: debates and protests by members have emerged in the Czech Republic and neighboring countries. In the fall of 2024, Czech police officers used “warning zero repression” (ČT24, 2024) due to deteriorating conditions and staff shortages, while in Poland they previously took sick leave en masse (“psia grypa/blue flu”) as a substitute for strikes, which are prohibited by law (Prawo.pl, 2018; Ustawa o rozwiązywaniu sporów zbiorowych, art. 19).

The issue has a transformational dimension in Central Europe: after 1989, the V4 countries built apolitical and professional security forces almost from scratch, which is why they enshrined exceptional restrictions on the rights of members in constitutions and special laws to prevent abuse of power, politicization, and disruption of the rule of law. After three decades, it is appropriate to assess their current adequacy, perception within the forces, and impact on loyalty and functioning.

The article analyzes the legal framework for restricting the fundamental rights of members of security forces in the Czech Republic and compares it with that of the V4 countries. It assesses the proportionality of these restrictions and their relationship to the motivation, loyalty, and willingness of members to accept them. The findings are placed in the context of regional security policy: the stability and quality of personnel are key to the security of regions and thus to their development.

Objective and Research Questions

The objective of this article is to conduct a legal-theoretical analysis of the specific restrictions on the fundamental rights of members of security forces in the Czech Republic, assess their justification and

proportionality, and determine how these regulatory interventions affect the motivation and loyalty of members to accept service commitments even at the cost of personal concessions. A secondary objective is to compare the situation with other Visegrad Group countries and identify common trends or differences in legislation.

The research seeks to answer the following questions in particular:

- RQ1: What fundamental rights and freedoms are restricted in the case of members of the security forces and what is the constitutional basis for this?
- RQ2: Are these restrictions in line with the principle of proportionality?
- RQ3: What is the legal regulation of similar restrictions in other V4 countries (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary) and how does it differ from or correspond to the Czech model?
- RQ4: What is the relationship between the restrictions on rights and the motivation or loyalty of members of the forces?

Theoretical and Legal Framework

Restrictions on fundamental rights are interventions that narrow the scope or manner of exercising a right; in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, they are only permissible by law and under the conditions of the constitutional order (Charter, 1993; Pl. ÚS 15/96, 1996). Article 4 of the Charter requires that it be lawful, respect equality, and preserve the essence and meaning of the law (Pospíšil *et al.*, 2023). Even in the public interest, therefore, there are limits that cannot be exceeded; each restriction is assessed by the test of legitimate aim and proportionality.

The Principle of Proportionality as a Constitutional Limit

To assess the proportionality of interference with rights, constitutional and international case law has developed the criterion of the principle of proportionality. This requires assessing the legitimate aim of the restriction and performing a three-step test:

- 1) suitability – whether the measure is capable of achieving the intended objective,
- 2) necessity – whether there is no other less restrictive measure to achieve the same objective, and
- 3) weight – whether the benefit of the measure (for the public interest) outweighs the harm to the right (Ondřejek, 2014).

In Czech law, the Constitutional Court formulated this test at the beginning of the 21st century and has been applying it in every constitutional review proceeding since then. The principle of proportionality acts as a safeguard for legislators – even if a law pursues a legitimate public interest, it must not go beyond what is necessary in a democratic society (Molek, 2013). In the context of restrictions on the rights of members of the security forces, proportionality is of fundamental importance: these restrictions often significantly interfere with the political or labor rights of individuals, which can only be justified if it is truly necessary to preserve the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law (Koudelka, 2019).

Constitutional and Legal Frameworks for Restricting the Rights of Members

The constitutional order of the Czech Republic allows for the restriction of the political rights of selected professions by law. Article 44 of the Charter stipulates that the law may restrict the right to engage in business and certain political rights for certain professions (in particular judges, prosecutors, members of the security forces and armed forces, and civil servants) if this is necessary for the performance of their duties (Charter, 1993). This is an authorization to impose restrictions only to the extent necessary. For members of the security forces, this applies in particular to the right to associate in political parties and movements, the right to strike, and certain economic freedoms. Furthermore, Article 27(4) of the Charter directly excludes the right to strike for judges, prosecutors, and members of the armed forces and security forces (Charter, 1993). A similar explicit provision is also contained in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (Constitution of the Slovak Republic, 1992).

The restrictions are specified in ordinary laws. In the Czech Republic, the basic regulation is Act No. 361/2003 Coll. (rights and obligations of police officers, firefighters, customs officers, prison services, etc.), supplemented by Act No. 273/2008 Coll. and special regulations. In Slovakia, Act No. 73/1998 Coll. and related regulations apply; in Poland, the *Ustawa o Policji* of 6 April 1990 (as amended). In Hungary, Act XXXIV/1994 on the police and other acts; the prohibition of political activity by uniformed services is also enshrined in the constitution and confirmed by the case law of the ECHR (Rekvényi v. Hungary, 1999).

Methodology

This study uses a qualitative theoretical-analytical methodology with a focus on legal analysis and a comparative approach. We base our analysis on relevant legal regulations (constitutional and sub-constitutional) governing the service relationship of members of security forces in the Czech Republic and

the V4 countries. It is based in particular on the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic and the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic in this area, as well as on selected decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The comparative part is based on available legal sources and studies describing the regulations in Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, including the relevant constitutional provisions and laws.

In addition to legal analysis, the article also works with available secondary data and empirical studies on the motivation and satisfaction of members of security forces (Kovařík, 2012). This data (from previous research, professional literature, and internal statistics) is used to assess the consequences of legal restrictions at the personnel level—that is, how they affect the morale, loyalty, and retention of members in service. The sources of information include professional publications (monographs, articles in peer-reviewed journals), official documents (analyses by public institutions, reports by service authorities), and internet sources (ČT24, 2024; iRozhlas, 2024).

Given the nature of the topic, the approach is primarily descriptive and analytical—the aim is to describe the current legal situation and evaluate it based on proportionality criteria. A comparison with the V4 countries allows us to place the Czech regulation in the context of the Central European region and reveal any specific features. The results of the legal analysis are then interpreted for the purpose of discussing the broader implications for regional security policy and institutional stability.

Results and Analysis

Legal Framework for the Restriction of Rights in the Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic, the main restrictions on the fundamental rights of members of the security forces are enshrined directly in Act No. 361/2003 Coll. (the Service Act for Security Forces) on the basis of the authorization in Article 44 of the Charter (Charter, 1993). The most significant restrictions include the following areas in particular:

- Prohibition of strikes: Article 27(4) of the Charter expressly excludes the right to strike for the armed forces and security forces; the prohibition is absolute. The reason for this is to ensure continuous operational readiness and protection of public order. The constitutionality of this ban has been repeatedly confirmed; under Article 11(2), the ECHR allows for the exclusion of the right to strike for the armed forces (*Rekvényi v. Hungary*, 1999), but at the same time rejected an absolute ban on professional associations of soldiers (*Matelly v. France*, 2014). In practice, therefore, dissatisfaction takes other forms of protest (ČT24, 2024).
- Prohibition of membership in political parties and political activity: The political neutrality of the security forces is a fundamental principle. Section 45 of Act No. 361/2003 Coll. prohibits members from joining a political party or movement or engaging in political activity (Act No. 361/2003 Coll.). The aim is to ensure impartiality and prevent abuse of the forces (Hejč, 2021). The measure is considered legitimate; Koudelka (2019) emphasizes that apoliticality is a prerequisite for trust in the impartial enforcement of the law. Violations are classified as very serious and lead to immediate dismissal (Section 42(1)(f) of Act No. 361/2003 Coll.). Neither the authorities nor the courts examine the specific impact; demonstrable membership or activity in a political party is sufficient (NSS, 2023). The Constitutional Court, referring to Article 44 of the Charter, confirmed the constitutionality of this provision (Pl. ÚS 15/96 1996; Pl. ÚS 24/17 2018). On June 27, 2023, in case no. 8 As 3/2021, the Supreme Administrative Court stated that even passive membership undermines confidence in impartiality (NSS, 2023). These principles correspond to the case law of the ECHR in *Rekvényi v. Hungary* (1999).
- Restrictions on gainful employment: Section 48 of Act No. 361/2003 Coll. allows secondary gainful employment only with the prior consent of a service official; such consent may be granted only if it does not jeopardize an important interest of the service, does not undermine the good name of the corps, and does not create a conflict of interest. Consent is not required for the management of one's own property, scientific, pedagogical, journalistic or artistic activities, and activities in trade unions, etc. Between 2006 and 2019, there was a virtually absolute ban on secondary gainful activities (except for the exceptions listed exhaustively), which the Constitutional Court repealed (Pl. ÚS 24/17 2018) on the grounds that restrictions must be clearly defined by law and must not interfere with the very existence of the right to conduct business. A subsequent amendment relaxed the regime and incorporated the exceptions directly into the law (Molek, 2013).
- Restrictions on the right of association: Members of the security forces may generally organize themselves into trade unions and collectively defend their interests, with the exception of members of the intelligence services, who are prohibited from union membership by Section 47(2) of Act No. 361/2003 Coll. The ban is justified by the protection of classified information and the specific nature of the service (Madej, 2018); the Constitutional Court has allowed national security requirements to take precedence over the right of association in these services (Pl. ÚS 24/17 2018). Trade unions exist in other services (e.g., the Independent Trade Union of the Police of the Czech Republic), but the right to strike does

not apply to civil service employment: the Charter does not grant this right to civil servants, and strikes are only possible in disputes over collective agreements under the Collective Bargaining Act, which does not apply to civil service employment (Charter, 1993; Act No. 2/1991 Coll.; Act No. 361/2003 Coll.).

For comparison: In Poland, there are strong police unions, but the law requires union activities to be apolitical and restricts other forms of association. Police officers may not be members of certain associations, especially foreign or international ones, without the knowledge of their superiors (Ustawa o Policji, art. 63). Police unions (e.g., TMRSZ) operate in Hungary, but their influence is weakened by legal and institutional limits on collective bargaining in the security sector (Act XLII/2015). In Slovakia, police unions are permitted, but professional soldiers are prohibited from forming union-type associations (Act No. 346/2005 Z. z.); Following the ECHR ruling in *Matelly v. France* (2014), a number of states have introduced professional associations for soldiers as a substitute for unions (EPSU, 2022).

The Czech Republic stands out within the V4 in that it allows unions in most corps; in contrast, there have been tendencies in Hungary to weaken collective bargaining in the public sector (EPSU, 2022). The limits of rights are set by law on the basis of constitutional authorization and must be proportionate. Even with strict restrictions (ban on strikes, political activities), other civil rights remain intact: electoral rights, the right to petition, the right to privacy, and, to a limited extent, the right of association (trade unions, professional associations where permitted), which prevents the de facto exclusion of members from democratic rights.

Comparison: Slovakia, Hungary, Poland

The V4 countries share a legal framework similar to that of the Czech Republic. Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary apply comparable restrictions, including depoliticization of the security forces, prohibition of strikes, and control over secondary activities (Hejč, 2021). Differences exist only in scope and wording:

- **Slovak Republic**
Slovak legislation closely resembles Czech legislation. Article 37(4) of the Slovak Constitution guarantees the right to strike, but expressly denies it to judges, prosecutors, and members of the armed forces and security corps (Slovak Constitution, 1992). Article 54 allows the restriction of the right to associate in trade unions and to engage in business for these categories by law. Based on this, Act No. 73/1998 Z.z. prohibits police officers from membership in political parties, establishes a duty of loyalty, and requires the consent of superiors for secondary activities. Police officers may form trade unions, but the Constitution does not grant these bodies the right to strike. Overall, Slovak legislation differs from the Czech model mainly in the details of wording.
- **Poland**
The Polish Constitution allows the right to strike to be restricted or prohibited for certain professions (Konstytucja RP 1997, art. 59(3)). The law on collective disputes prohibits strikes in state bodies, the judiciary, and administration, so police officers are not allowed to strike (Ustawa o rozwiązywaniu sporów, 1991). The Police Act enforces strict apoliticality: “policjant nie może być członkiem partii politycznej” (Police Act, 1990) and requires reporting of membership in associations; membership in foreign or international organizations is subject to the consent of the police president (Police Act, art. 63(3)–(4)). Police unions exist with the ability to engage in collective bargaining, but striking is prohibited (Police Act, art. 67; Statute of NSZZ Policjantów). In 2018, police officers used mass “sick leave” as a form of pressure, which contributed to a salary increase (iRozhlas, 2024).
- **Hungary**
After 1989, Hungary constitutionally banned police officers' membership in political parties and political activities through a 1993 amendment (1993. évi CVII. törvény az Alkotmány módosításáról), inserted into § 40/B(4). In *Rekvényi v. Hungary* (1999), the ECHR confirmed the legitimacy and proportionality of depoliticization, establishing a precedent cited across Europe, including the Czech Republic. Hungary also bans strikes for police and military personnel; trade unions exist, but collective bargaining in the public sector is weak. In the last decade, centralization and interference in institutional independence have affected the security forces (Blažková, 2025).

The overarching principle in all V4 countries is that members of the security forces must remain impartial and disciplined, and are therefore subject to legitimate restrictions on their rights. Strikes and political engagement are universally prohibited; trade unions are permitted (except in military and intelligence services) but operate under limited powers and supervision. National deviations—such as the reporting obligation for union membership in Poland or a broader constitutional list of professions without strike rights in Slovakia—do not alter the overall picture. The Czech model aligns with regional standards and meets European requirements for protecting national security and public order.

Proportionality and Assessment of the Adequacy of Restrictions

In the Czech Republic, most restrictions on the rights of members of security forces have been subject to judicial review and were found to be constitutionally compliant:

- **Prohibition of strikes:** The Constitutional Court accepts an absolute ban on strikes by security forces under Article 27(4) of the Charter, with only minimal forms of protest being discussed. By contrast, Western European countries allow limited strike action: in Finland, police strikes are possible provided “protective work” (tasks necessary to safeguard life and health) continues; this was applied during the strikes in April 2025 (Police of Finland, 2025). In the Netherlands, strikes are legally permitted if proportionate and procedurally compliant; in 2024, a planned police strike led to the cancellation of the Feyenoord–Ajax match (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 2015). Such mechanisms and professional associations mitigate the effects of restrictions; similar alternatives are largely undeveloped in the V4. In the Czech context, the ban pursues a legitimate aim, is necessary, and overall proportionate. While the final step of proportionality (weighing harm versus public benefit) may be debated, both practice and ECHR case law support the state given the high importance of public safety (Blažková, 2025).
- **Ban on political activity:** The restriction is generally considered proportionate, aiming to ensure the impartiality and apolitical nature of the forces. Milder variants (e.g., allowing membership but prohibiting active participation) are difficult to enforce and risk politicization. A complete ban is administratively clear and prevents conflicts of loyalty between service obligations and party allegiance. Both the Constitutional Court and the ECHR have upheld this approach (*Rekvényi v. Hungary*, 1999). Although the restriction affects freedom of expression and association, the essence of rights remains intact: members can vote and maintain private opinions, but cannot organize politically or campaign. The benefits—public trust and loyalty to law and constitution—outweigh the disadvantages.
- **Restrictions on business and secondary activities:** In Pl. ÚS 24/17, the Constitutional Court drew a line between reasonable and excessive restrictions. The original absolute ban (2006–2019) was deemed too strict and formally flawed (ÚS 2018). After the amendment, secondary activities are allowed with consent, and the law specifies when this is necessary. The licensing system is proportionate: it prevents conflicts of interest while allowing flexibility; ex post sanctions (allowing freedom and punishing misuse afterward) would be insufficient. Public administration benefits outweigh individual infringements, making the post-2019 regime proportionate.
- **Restrictions on trade unions (informants):** The ECHR permits excluding armed forces and police from forming trade unions (Article 11(2) of the Convention), but *Matelly v. France* (2014) rejected an absolute ban for soldiers, recognizing professional associations instead. In the Czech Republic, the ban for intelligence officers is justified on national security grounds (Constitutional Court, 2018), but proportionality remains debatable. Less restrictive alternatives exist, such as internal councils for communication with management without forming public trade unions. Although the ECHR has not directly addressed this, foreign practice (e.g., Germany) offers guidance: intelligence officers may join certain professional organizations under confidentiality conditions. In the Czech Republic and V4 countries, such exceptions are narrowly defined, while most members are allowed union participation.

Overall, Czech and Central European legislation restricting the rights of security forces meets legality and the legitimacy of objectives. The main challenge lies in proportionality, i.e., whether restrictions are excessive. Historical developments show that overly strict restrictions, such as the pre-2019 ban on secondary employment, have been corrected. In other areas, consensus holds that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages, as with bans on strikes and political activity.

Motivation, Loyalty, and Willingness to Accept Restrictions

Even the most perfect legal regulation only works if it is accepted by members. Acceptance of restrictions on rights is not automatic; it depends on the perceived fairness of the “service contract,” the motives for service, and the sense of moral and material compensation (Perry, Wise, 1990). Research shows that members often see their work as a mission, identify strongly with public service, and are willing to make personal sacrifices. Overall motivation stems from a combination of external incentives (salary, security, benefits) and internal values (meaning of work, prestige of the profession, collective identity) (Blažková, 2025).

Empirical surveys in the Czech Republic and neighboring countries show that the satisfaction and loyalty of members are mainly determined by the meaningfulness of their work, fair evaluation and recognition, opportunities for development and career advancement, good relationships, and working conditions. Frustration is caused by excessive administration, bureaucracy, unclear command structures, and a feeling of insufficient appreciation; Czech police officers are strongly demotivated by unnecessary administrative tasks and perceived clientelism in promotions. Motivated and satisfied officers show greater loyalty, discipline, and willingness to “go above and beyond” their duties (so-called organizational citizenship behavior) (Vogel, Kroll, 2019).

The connection with the acceptance of restrictions on rights is fundamental: internally motivated officers understand them as a natural part of the profession. Empirical evidence from Poland and Belgium shows that police officers with a high level of public service show greater satisfaction and are more accepting of demanding conditions (Prysmakova, Vandenabeele, 2020). However, this only applies when there is a perception of fairness; fair compensation and procedures are key (Wolfe, Lawson, 2020). If financial remuneration, social security, and moral recognition balance out the “burden” of restrictions on rights, the willingness to accept restrictions is high.

This thesis is also supported by data from the Czech Republic: as long as the security forces had relatively above-standard benefits, job stability, and social prestige, interest in service and retention was high - despite all the restrictions (which was reflected, for example, in the high number of applicants at the beginning of the millennium). However, as soon as pay conditions deteriorated, benefits were reduced, or prestige declined, there was an exodus and dissatisfaction (see protests in 2024; ČT24, 2024).

The generational factor should also be mentioned: the younger generation of members is less willing to tolerate various restrictions and expects to be able to fulfill themselves outside of the service. For example, the ban on entrepreneurship can be demotivating for those with an entrepreneurial spirit. The older generation, on the other hand, may have emphasized security and come to terms with the restrictions more easily. That is why it is important to think about personnel policy: for example, providing alternatives for self-fulfillment (specialized projects within the corps instead of entrepreneurship, the possibility of earning overtime, etc.) so that active individuals do not leave (Blažková, 2025).

The concept of public loyalty - loyalty to the state and the democratic system - also has a special relationship to restrictions. If members believe in the legitimacy of state power and identify with its mission, they are more likely to accept that they must sacrifice something for it. Conversely, if they feel that the state is abusing their loyalty (e.g., politically or through insufficient support), internal conflict may arise.

Discussion

The quality and loyalty of security forces personnel directly affects regional security. Staff shortages and high turnover increase response times, reduce clarity, and weaken prevention; regions with lower capacity tend to have higher crime rates and become less attractive to residents and investors (Chalfin, McCrary, 2017). Regional politicians and security managers must therefore systematically strive for personnel stability and motivation within the forces.

The restrictions on rights described above are a necessary prerequisite for the functioning of the forces, but at the same time they are a factor that can affect personnel stability. Regional development therefore indirectly depends on how the state and the leadership of the forces deal with the challenge of maintaining the loyalty of members in an environment of these restrictions. Several recommendations and considerations arise from practice:

- **Strengthening compensation**
The state (including through regional budgets, if they support municipal police forces, for example) should ensure that restrictions are balanced by appropriate benefits. This includes decent pay, but also non-financial motivators such as public recognition of merit, opportunities for self-fulfillment, and social security. The fairness of the remuneration system significantly influences whether officers accept restrictions as justified.
- **Dialogue and involvement of officers**
Although officers often do not have the right to strike, effective social dialogue and union representation are key “safety valves” and early warning systems for problems; European reports on trade union rights in the security forces and police union practices repeatedly confirm this (EPSU, EuroCOP, EUROMIL, 2022). For example, a regional security council can regularly meet with representatives of members to discuss conditions of service, thereby preventing the escalation of hidden resistance.
- **Flexibility of restrictions within the limits of the law**
Although the frameworks are set by law, in practice some restrictions can be applied sensitively. For example, the ban on secondary activities - service officials should reasonably assess applications and not refuse permission unnecessarily unless the interests of the service are at risk. Similarly, political neutrality does not necessarily mean that a police officer cannot have an opinion—it is more a prohibition on public political statements. Internal culture should promote openness: officers can discuss social issues internally without considering it a violation of neutrality (Šimíček, 2010).
- **Trust and legitimacy of institutions**
Regional authorities must build trust in fair and predictable leadership. Perceived favoritism and non-transparent promotions undermine loyalty and often demotivate more than the level of remuneration itself (Tyson, Charman, 2023). The ministry and regional directorates must therefore make personnel

decisions transparently and maintain functional channels of social dialogue, thereby strengthening legitimacy and preventing hidden resistance (EPSU, EuroCOP, EUROMIL, 2022).

- Civil cooperation and public understanding: Corps leaders and politicians must clearly explain the specifics of the service relationship. The public should understand that police officers and firefighters cannot enforce their rights through normal methods and that protests such as “no fines” are a sign of distress, not laziness or blackmail (ČT24, 2024). Partnerships with the public boost morale; regions should support outreach projects (open days, social events) that strengthen solidarity and justify the value of this service (Blažková, 2025).

The stability of security forces when restricting rights is a search for a balance between the necessary restrictions for order and discipline and the human factor of the members. Regional development requires a secure environment, i.e., reliable and loyal forces. Loyalty is mutual: the state can only legitimately demand it if it also demonstrates it through support, predictable leadership, and fair treatment.

Conclusion

The issue of restrictions on the rights of members of security forces lies at the intersection of law, security policy, and human resource management. In the Czech Republic and other V4 countries, a model of legal restrictions (in particular, a ban on strikes, political engagement, and limits on economic activities) based on explicit constitutional authorization (Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 1993; Constitution of the Slovak Republic, 1992; Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997). These restrictions pursue legitimate objectives - the protection of the public interest, security, neutrality, and efficiency - and, when properly applied, pass the test of proportionality. Regional legislation is in line with European standards and case law, which allow for justified exceptions to general rights.

Comparatively, Czech legislation is consistent with that of neighbouring countries; minor differences (e.g. the Polish notification requirement for associations or the Slovak constitutional wording) do not change the overall picture. However, practice is decisive: acceptance of restrictions is based on motivation and loyalty. Findings show that if key conditions are met, such as meaningful service, fair remuneration, and respect for members, most restrictions are perceived as an acceptable part of the profession. If the balance fails, there is a risk of a decline in loyalty and the departure of qualified people; relying solely on discipline enforced by law is not enough. It is necessary to actively care for personnel; otherwise, formal restrictions will result in poorer functioning of the forces.

Restrictions on the rights of members of security forces are a necessary and largely legitimate exception to constitutional protection; they ensure the stability, neutrality, and functionality of the forces and thus support regional and national development. It is crucial to maintain proportionality, preventing both excessive expansion of restrictions and underestimation of compensation. Security challenges relevant to regional development will persist (crises, migration waves, etc.).

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